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The impact of globalisation on the poor is one of the most emotive
debates in the development policy community. Just contrast two state-
ments. Oxfam’s submission to the UK government’s consultation on
globalisation states that “the benefits of globalisation have been dis-
proportionately captured by rich countries and powerful transnational
companies, while poor countries and poor people have been left
behind” (Oxfam (2000)). Akey World Bank report on the issue writes
that “a widespread view of globalisation is that ‘it makes rich people
richer and poor people poorer’. This simply does not seem to be true:
poverty is falling rapidly in those poor countries that are integrating
into the global economy” (World Bank (2002)). In this paper, I will
revisit some of the issues involved, focusing on poor developing coun-
tries. More specifically I will focus on one of the poorest countries in
the world, Ethiopia.
In the general debate, globalisation is used as an evocative term
describing the closer integration of societies and economies around
the world. Integration is linked to lower trade barriers, reduced costs
of transport, faster communication, including of ideas, and rising cap-
ital flows. Much macroeconomic policy advice towards African coun-
tries and other developing countries by the main international institu-
tions has in recent few decades largely focused on trade and exchange
liberalisation, as well as on creating conditions to encourage capital
inflows. Much has changed in this respect in a large number of coun-
tries compared to, say, 20 years ago. Internationally traded goods are
now widely available, while most African countries currently have
exchange rate regimes close to full convertibility.
Ethiopia is no exception. Despite being a late starter in reforming
its economic policy environment, it has embarked on many of the
standard economic reform measures advocated by international insti-
tutions such as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund. Until
1991, the country had been embroiled in a civil war between regional
nationalists and a regime largely dependent on funding and policy
advice from the former Eastern bloc. This regime had enforced state
control in the key economic sectors and large scale restrictions on
internal and international trade. After its collapse and its replacement
with a coalition of regional nationalist groups, an economic reform
programme has started, still relatively slowly but steadily, involving
liberalisation and privatisation of parts of the domestic economy, and
604a start with international trade liberalisation and the encouragement of
foreign investment.
This programme has brought clear benefits to economic activity in
the country, but it would be hard to argue that its efforts to open up
have brought large benefits in terms of substantial capital investment
and employment creation, and with it, increased earnings. It could
also be argued that the main reason for the lack of investment response
has been the slow pace and the incompleteness of the reform efforts:
more vigorous liberalisation efforts are then advocated as the solu-
tion. For example, the Ethiopian economic reform can be contrasted
with the Ugandan economic reform efforts of the last 15 years, which
has seen rapid and sustained economic growth of more than 7 percent
per year on average. But even in Uganda the investment response has
long been far smaller than the expectations created by the extent of lib-
eralisation and remarkable reversal of the economic policy environ-
ment.
In this paper, I will discuss the challenges faced by poor African
countries such as Ethiopia to beneficially engage in a more integrated
world economy. More specifically, the risk of further marginalisation
of African economies will be highlighted. This marginalisation is not
just linked to the widely held view of a continent torn apart by civil
conflict. Even in more peaceful contexts, i.e. in the majority of
African societies, these risks are present and are linked to poor pol-
icy exacerbating the impact of poor geographic endowments. Ethiopia
is no exception and faces an uphill struggle to lift itself out of this
marginal position. Nevertheless, I will argue that it has few alterna-
tives to increased openness if it wants to achieve widespread poverty
reduction, but complementary measures would be needed. To back
this up, I will present evidence on the distributional consequences of
increased market integration. More specifically, the experience dur-
ing the first, serious wave of market reform in Ethiopia, up to the
mid-1990s, is documented, with an emphasis on its impact on rural
poverty. The communities studied experienced on average strong pos-
itive effects from this reform, and poverty declined. But a dichotomy
emerges across the poor: one group of poor, with reasonably good
endowments in terms of labour, infrastructure and geography took
full advantage and moved out of poverty; another group, with poorer
labour and geographical endowments remained at the same, desper-
ately low welfare level – and these households risk becoming increas-
ingly marginalised. 
605II. GLOBALISATION AND THE POOR: THEORYAND MACRO-
EVIDENCE
One has to be careful to identify correctly the ‘theory’ of beneficial
globalisation. Simply speaking, it is the combination of standard argu-
ments for free trade and markets, combined with an appeal to a growth
effect from the trade regime. This is different from the results from
standard trade theory, which simply predicts ‘gains from trade’ from
exploiting comparative advantage – effectively a once-and-for-all
increase in output and income. The ‘globalisation’ argument appeals
to ever increasing output – growth – induced by openness. In the par-
lance of the endogenous growth literature, it suggests that trade-ori-
entation is a specific ‘initial condition’, affecting long-run steady state
output and growth. The mechanism by which openness affects growth
could be manifold: from incentives to increase efficiency following
more competition to the development of better market-oriented insti-
tutions from the confrontation with the rest of the world.
The impact on the poor is typically not well identified in theory –
if only since most growth models are representative agent models.
However, the argument typically is an extension of the standard dis-
tributional impact of the trade liberalisation in standard theory – based
on the Hecksher-Ohlin model, or related insights from the Stolper-
Samuelson setup. In particular, labour is the most abundant factor in
most poor developing countries, so that trade liberalisation would
encourage specialisation in labour-intensive production, increasing
labour demand. Labour is usually the only asset of the poor so that
trade liberalisation results in poverty reduction. The growth effects
from openness further contribute to poverty reduction, via increased
labour demand. 
There is empirical evidence of the expansion of labour-intensive pro-
duction in developing countries, consistent with their comparative
advantage. Davis and Weinstein (2003) found that developing country
exports as a whole are now indeed labour-intensive. Countries such as
China, India, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Indonesia – due to their pop-
ulation size constituting the majority of the population of the develop-
ing world - all have a share of manufacturing in total exports above or
close to the world average. There is also evidence of substantial poverty
reduction in a number of developing countries over recent decades,
most notably in China, where between 1978 and 1999 the number of
poor declined by more than 200 million. Other more recent success
606stories include Vietnam, where poverty was cut in half in the 1990s,
while World Bank data show that poverty also declined by about 4 per-
cent per year in Uganda and India between 1993 and 1998. 
The success in poverty reduction is typically larger in countries that
have been able to increase their share of trade to GDP substantially
since the 1980. World Bank (2002) defines the ‘globalisers’as the top
third of developing countries in terms of the extent that they have
been able to increase their trade share in this period – in total about 3
billion people, dominated by China and India in terms of population1.
It is indeed the case that on average these ‘globalisers’have been more
successful both in terms of growth and poverty reduction than the
other developing countries. The presence of China and India in this
group is then largely responsible for a global decline in absolute
poverty levels in the 1990s. This needs to be qualified by the fact that
inequality has nevertheless increased in the largest ‘globaliser’, China,
although not necessarily in other countries in this group.
But the use of the term ‘globalisers’ may be misleading2: the fact
that trade increased is not necessarily caused by a conscious policy of
trade,  exchange  rate  and  financial  liberalisation. The  causal  link
between openness, growth and poverty reduction is harder to proof,
and is still hotly debated. For example, Dollar (1992), Sachs and
Warner (1995) and Dollar and Kraay (2001) claim that liberal trade
policies cause growth. Rodriguez and Rodrik (1999) argue that these
studies are methodologically flawed and that they mainly show that
good economic institutions matter for growth, not trade-orientation. In
Rodrik’s view, liberalization may not be all that important and activist
policies could well bring about more substantial trade and growth
increases. Dollar and Kraay (2001) further show that there is a one-
to-one relationship in mean income growth and income growth of the
poorest 20 percent, leading to the insight that ‘growth is good for the
poor’, which should be properly understood as meaning that inequal-
ity is not affected: proportionately, the gap between the poor and the
mean individual remains constant. They argue further that trade does
not change this relationship. Ravallion (2001) finds compelling evi-
dence that while on average openness does not affect inequality, in
low income countries it is associated with greater inequality. He also
finds that even though on average growth is inequality-neutral, beyond
this average there is a diversity of experiences across the world, with
some growth episodes coinciding with increases in inequality and
other with decreases in inequality.
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tion should be qualified. There is no evidence of any countries suc-
ceeding in bringing down poverty substantially without increasing
growth (Ravallion (2001)). There is also not much evidence of coun-
tries in the world delivering substantial growth via persistent protec-
tion, or of countries that have been able to increase their growth rates
by increasing protection. Openness may well be a characteristic of
successful economies, possibly a necessary condition, but its impor-
tance and sufficiency is still debatable. 
While some developing countries have been able to increase growth
and their trade share, and reduce poverty, many others have failed in
all these respects. Most of Africa and quite a few Asian and Latin-
American countries are in this situation, comprising about 2 billion
people. If anything, many of these countries appear to become increas-
ingly marginalised in the world economy, with negative per capita
growth rates in the recent decade and small but significant increases
in poverty levels, and possibly even ‘club convergence’ towards per-
manently lower levels of income per capita. A key issue is then to
understand why. A simple explanation may be that they had bad poli-
cies, not least in terms of trade orientation. But this cannot be the full
story: quite a few of these African, Asian and Latin American coun-
tries did introduce some trade liberalisation in the last two decades, but
with little impact in terms of sustained growth. A related explanation
is that even with trade liberalisation, growth is being stifled by poor
infrastructure, low education and corruption. Again, this would sug-
gest that policy makers bear a substantial responsibility for low growth
and the persistence of poverty. However, there are alternative possi-
ble explanations. One suggestive one is that some countries suffer
from the fundamental disadvantages of location – landlocked disease-
prone tropical countries with harsh natural environments face a fun-
damental cost disadvantage (Sachs and Warner (1995)). There is
indeed evidence for Africa that marketing and transport costs are sub-
stantially higher, but these are largely influenced by investment in the
quality of infrastructure. For example, Collier and Gunning (1999)
report that port charges in Abidjan are far higher than in Antwerp: a con-
tainer costs $200 in the former compared to $120 in the latter. Air trans-
port in Africa is four times as expensive as in Asia, while rail freight
charges are about double. In short, the differential growth experience
between some of the largest Asian economies compared to Africa can-
not easily be explained by simple geographical disadvantage. 
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countries to increase their growth rates and trade shares, there is rea-
son to be concerned that they may ‘have missed the boat’(World Bank
(2002)). Possible reasons could be that increasing returns in manu-
facturing activities and general agglomeration effects, i.e. externalities
to locating in the same geographical areas, would have meant that
firms locate in clusters. While many clusters could be formed, firms
have already located in some labour-abundant economies so that late-
comers have little to offer. Furthermore, the mere fact that some devel-
oping countries with similar initial characteristics have not missed the
boat may induce further negative externalities from globalisation: not
only will firms not locate in the latecomers, increased capital market
liberalisation in the globalising economies, so that capital inflows are
easier,  will  encourage  capital  to  flow  away  from  the  marginal
economies. This could happen even if these marginal economies did
not liberalise capital markets; in that case via illegal capital flight. For
example, by 1990, 40 percent of private African wealth was held out-
side Africa, even though capital is scarcer in Africa than anywhere
else in the world. Another self-perpetuating mechanism of marginal-
isation includes the apparent higher risk of civil war in economies
more heavily dependent on primary commodities, increasing the cost
of its failure to engage in the world economy (Collier, Hoeffler and
Pattillo (2001)). 
All this paints rather a bleak future for these marginal economies,
not least in Africa. They may be stuck in a growth and poverty trap –
an  equilibrium  outcome  with  permanently  low  growth  and  high
poverty. While plausible, there is no reason for uniform pessimism,
although naive optimism would be misplaced as well. In recent few
decades a number of countries, often written off by experts, have been
able to transform themselves. For example, World Bank (2002) quotes
how Nobel winner Gunnar Myrdal wrote off Indonesia in the 1960s
only for it to emerge in the 1980s as a fast growing economy sub-
stantially reducing poverty aided by labour-intensive manufacturing
exports. Even after the serious crisis of the late 1990s, poverty is far
lower than in the early 1980s. Similarly, after descending into chaos
and civil war in the first part of the 1980s, Uganda has emerged as a
fast growing economy, delivering large poverty reduction in both rural
and urban areas. 
However, the change required in many developing is substantial. If
the current outcomes are an equilibrium growth and poverty trap, then
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equilibria at play, then only a substantial ‘shock’may bring these coun-
tries onto a higher growth path. Few would argue that mere trade ori-
entation would do the trick. A drastic transformation of the invest-
ment climate, with better institutions and infrastructure would be
required, as well as much improved public service delivery of educa-
tion and health services to increase the human capital required to fully
capture the benefits from new investment. Globalisation may have
moved the production processes of many goods across the world, mak-
ing Nike and other multinational companies the scourge of antiglob-
alisation campaigners across the world. But multinationals do not even
appear to consider investing in these marginal economies, not least in
Africa. 
So where does this leave a country like Ethiopia? It started with
economic reform towards a more market oriented economy over the
last decade, but it is hard to find evidence of a real transformation.
Some quarters of Addis Ababa appear to experience a boom, but these
are largely an aid-fuelled real-estate led expansion of the non-tradable
sector. Some urban centres with their surrounding countryside appear
to have experienced strong growth in recent year, but their scale is
too small to suggest the establishment of serious growth poles. It
remains on the fringes of the world economy, with only its coffee ever
appearing in shopping baskets in Europe. Poverty levels have declined
a little, but population growth has meant that the number of poor has
probably increased in the last 10 years. 
It has only just emerged from another war, this time with Eritrea,
which it only 10 years ago granted independence. Even if observers
and most international donors do not pin much blame on the Ethiopian
government for the conflict, it again underlined the regional political
instability, with civil war also raging in neighbouring Sudan and con-
tinuing anarchy in parts of former Somalia. Its own political institu-
tions remain characterised by a reluctance to grant much voice to
opposition groups even if many have little credibility. Ethnic tensions
remain substantial. Its infrastructure has improved in recent years but
it still has only a very limited road and communications network.
There is evidence of some improvement in education as well, but skill
and health levels remain generally poor. 
But Ethiopia should be given some credit. It is generally considered
one of the developing countries with least corruption. Its civil service,
while using antiquated and opaque procedures, tends to be relatively
610efficient and definitely accountable. Its macroeconomic policy man-
agement has made the birr a remarkably stable currency, even during
the years of civil war and famine3. It appears committed to reform,
even though opening up appears to go slowly. Recurrent drought puts
much pressure on efforts to transform agriculture, even if there is also
evidence of improved ability to manage these drought-induced crises
in the short run using food aid and other transfer mechanisms.
Poverty and growth traps may ask for bold measures, in the form
of risk-taking in economic policy to enforce a regime change, even
though recent economic history across the world suggests that one
cannot guarantee success. The political economy in Ethiopia with seri-
ous suspicions towards the government among the nascent middle-
classes suggests that gradual reform may only be possible, even if
possibly insufficient. An improved investment climate requires not
only a commitment to change; it requires that this commitment is cred-
ible to local and foreign investors. At present, the policy environment
is not sufficiently credible, also affecting the willingness of donors to
commit at a large scale the essential foreign aid to support the trans-
formation of institutions, public services and infrastructure, which sup-
ported for example the Ugandan success story. 
III. GLOBALISATION AND THE  POOR:  RISKING  FURTHER
MARGINALISATION
So far, we have focused on the evolution of poverty, comparing the
experience of ‘globalising’ and seemingly marginalised developing
countries. The faster growing ‘globalising’developing countries man-
aged to reduce poverty substantially, while the other developing coun-
tries appear rather stagnant, including in terms of poverty. However,
there is another dimension that has received far less attention. Growth
induced by market and trade liberalisation is not necessarily shared
equally across the poor. Liberalisation induces relative price changes
within countries, improving terms of trade between tradable and non-
tradable sectors. Some groups depending on the latter sector may lose
in this process. Furthermore, to the extent that geography and agglom-
eration effects matter, certain regions may permanently lose out, for
example to regions near seaports and near international or key inter-
nal transport routes. Ravallion (2001) reported that trade liberalisa-
tion, while correlated with growth, is also correlated with increased
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(2000) find ‘geographical poverty traps’in China, i.e. particular areas
that have permanently lower growth rates linked to community or
regional level externalities. In India, there is substantial variation
across and within states in growth rates, with some urban areas such
as Bangalore, Bombay, Madras and Hyderabad far outpacing growth
rates and poverty reduction in other states and areas. 
This process is also likely to be relevant in African countries such
as Ethiopia. In fact, it is possible to see this process in action in
Ethiopia well before true globalisation takes hold. As part of its moves
to a more market based economy from a centrally controlled ‘social-
ist’ economy, the Ethiopian government liberalised its domestic agri-
cultural markets between 1989 and 1992. Combined with the end of
the civil war in 1991 and the liberalisation of the movement of goods
across regions around the same time, this change can be seen as an
overall trade liberalisation between regions, from a situation of region-
ally closed economies. Before 1989, most trade between regions was
either banned or very heavily taxed (Dercon (2002)), so that inter-
nally,  the  Ethiopian  economy  more  resembled  a  set  of  closed
economies with high tariff barriers limiting the free flow of goods and
services. The liberalisation within Ethiopia from 1989 was then in the
first instance a move to greater openness between regions within a
country, not unlike the changes advocated by international institutions
between countries. The growth and distributional impact of these
changes can be studied using the Ethiopian Rural Household Survey,
a panel data survey covering households in different communities
from 1989 until 2000. Lessons from studying welfare changes in this
period are likely to be relevant to understand the implications on the
poor of trade and investment policy liberalisation. Dercon and Krish-
nan (2002) and Dercon (2002) give more details on the data and the
findings. The results related to the first phase of trade liberalisation,
between 1989 and 1995, are briefly summarised below. They are only
based on a small sample of 351 households in six different commu-
nities across the country. No other data covering this period exist in
Ethiopia. 
The policy measures meant that compared to before 1989, agricul-
tural crops could move freely across regional borders within the coun-
try, without trade restrictions and heavy tariffs. Cereals such as teff,
wheat and maize were most strongly affected. The result was that there
was downward pressure on staple food crop prices in food deficit areas
612while they increased in surplus areas following liberalisation. Afurther
measure allowing free entry in many trade and other business activi-
ties meant that food and other markets became spatially more inte-
grated, resulting in lower marketing margins (Dercon (1995)). The
measures had less impact on previously smuggled crops, such as cof-
fee and chat: now legally traded, prices settled at first close to the lev-
els seen in black markets before the liberalisation, while a decline in
world coffee prices meant actual declines in prices for coffee farmers.
Finally, crops that were typically non-traded across regional borders,
such as bulky crops like enset and yams, became relatively less inter-
esting to grow, since they were typically grown in cereal deficit areas,
where consumer now could benefit from decreases in staple food
prices. The overall result was that terms of trade moved very favourably
for farmers in food surplus areas, especially in cereal areas, but they
(relatively) declined for farmers specializing in export crops such as
coffee and chat, as well as in less traded crops such as enset. 
These effects are also apparent in the survey villages. Those vil-
lages in large cereal producing areas saw their terms of trade4 improve
by about a third. Villages dependent on coffee or non-traded food
crops saw their terms of trade decline by about 30 percent. These large
shifts in terms of trade also had substantial welfare implications. Over-
all, poverty, based on an absolute poverty line, declined substantially
in this period in the sample: the number of poor households declined
by about a third in our sample, even though it still kept more than a
40 percent of households poor5. In Dercon (2002), it is shown that a
substantial part of this poverty decline can be directly linked to the
terms of trade changes, with the extent of the poverty decline per vil-
lage correlated with the terms of trade change. In fact, in the two vil-
lages were terms of trade declined, poverty did not decline at all, and
it increased substantially in one of them. 
However, this is not the full story. Terms of trade changes do not
affect every household in a village in the same way, while the other lib-
eralisation measures may also provide opportunities or introduce other
costs on households. A simple means of illustrating these effects, is to
consider a profile of the characteristics correlated with poverty changes.
Table 1 gives details of changes in poverty by characteristics of house-
holds in the sample. Poverty declined for (virtually) all different groups
considered. However, it is striking that for some groups it declined much
more and some changes are insignificant. Very few household heads
have education, but those heads with primary education live in house-
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female-headed households saw no significant decline: the younger and
male-headed households have gained most. Similarly, those with sub-
stantial land and with oxen saw large declines; those with less land or
no oxen saw none. Those close to all-weather-roads and those close to
towns also experienced substantial declines in poverty. Households liv-
ing in remote areas have not been able to benefit in this period.
However, better weather in some areas is definitely a mitigating
factor. We used data on rainfall in the last year before each survey, as
well as rains in the last five years preceding the survey. Half the vil-
lages experienced better rains in the last year before the survey. The
rainfall in the last year in comparison with 1989 does not contribute
in explaining the differential experience of households and villages:
for both groups, poverty declined by a similar percentage and the
decline is significant. However, one year of poor rain may not lead to
impoverishment. The last line of Table 1 groups households on the
basis of whether the average yearly rainfall in the five years preced-
ing the survey in 1994/95 compared to the rains in the five years pre-
ceding the 1989/90 survey. Here, we get a very significant effect of
improved weather, while in areas where rains in 1990-94 were worse,
poverty actually went up. 
These findings were confirmed by further multivariate analysis of
welfare changes – details are in Dercon (2002). Controlling for the
impact of better weather, it was found that proximity to roads and towns,
and stronger household characteristics in terms of land, labour, educa-
tion and oxen were all important determinants of larger consumption
changes and stronger poverty declines. Microsimulations have shown
that the entire observed poverty decline can be attributed to geography,
infrastructure and household endowments, implying that those poor peo-
ple in 1989 that were living far from roads or towns, and/or had lim-
ited household endowments in terms of assets and labour could not at
all take advantage of the changed economic environment by 1995. They
stayed as poor as before, and would have been further impoverished
had the rains not been somewhat better than in the late 1980s. In other
words, one group of the poor benefited substantially from the relative
price changes and the generally improved market incentives, while
another group became even more marginalised. Further analysis of more
recent data from the same villages has confirmed this result: we find a
growth effect in the 1990s from better initial levels of endowments in
terms of household characteristics, geography and infrastructure.
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There is a close correlation between the role of trade in GDP, overall
growth and poverty reduction in developing countries. Growth and
poverty reduction has accelerated in those economies that have suc-
cessfully increased their trade share in income. However, whether
there is a direct causal link between trade policy, growth and poverty
reduction is still disputed. Still, the substantial poverty reductions in
some developing countries, such as China and more recently, parts of
India are beyond doubt. 
For  many  other  developing  countries,  globalisation  is  still  far
removed. In fact, there are concerns that these countries may well
become further marginalised. The reasons include poor policy envi-
ronment but also poor geographical endowments. It will be a difficult
task to stop this process of marginalisation, not least since there are
risks that they may get trapped in permanently low growth and high
poverty due to the externalities related to globalisation and marginali-
sation. Concerned efforts within these countries with substantial outside
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TABLE 1
Poverty profile: poverty changes between 1989 and 1994/95 (n=351)
YES NO
Po P0 change Po P0 change
89 94/95 t-test 89 94/95 t-test
Household head did complete primary school? (3%) 0.83 0.25 3.54** 0.60 0.47 3.65**
Head of household is below 45 years of age? (55%) 0.64 0.41 4.18** 0.59 0.50 1.84
Household head is male? (83%) 0.620.45 4.12 ** 0.57 0.48 0.93
Household own oxen? (67%) 0.59 0.423.93** 0.65 0.55 1.62
Household owns more than 0.45 ha per adult? (50%) 0.54 0.38 3.15** 0.68 0.54 2.76**
Village is <5km from all-weather road? (44%) 0.54 0.29 4.54** 0.67 0.59 1.67
Village is <10km from town? (53%) 0.70 0.35 7.08** 0.520.58 1.11
Rains in 1993/94 better than in 1988/89 0.57 0.41 3.16** 0.66 0.51 2.71**
Rains in last 5 years better than previous 5 years (53%) 0.70 0.35 7.08** 0.520.58 1.11
Source: calculated from the Ethiopian Rural Household Survey
Percentage in brackets after each question is the proportion with the particular characteristic. ‘YES’
block gives the percentage of poor in 89 and in 94/95, restricted to those with a particular character-
istic. The ‘NO’ block gives the poverty levels for those without this characteristic. The t-test tests the
null whether these poverty levels are significantly different using Kakwani’s test. The characteristics
are those in 1994/95. In a very small number of cases there was a change in these chareacteristics. For
example, a few households had a different head and a change in the sex of the head (due to the death
of the household head). No new roads were constructed in the survey areas. A few households had a
change in land size (due to inheritance, marriage of children, and in one village a redistribution of col-
lective lands). These changes are generally too small to significantly affect the results.support are likely to be needed to improve the investment climate in
these economies. 
There is some evidence that particular groups and areas may also
risk becoming marginalised within the globalising economies. High
growth may provide the means to avoid this process to become self-
perpertuating, but action would in any case be needed. The factors
correlated with this marginalisation are typically poor local endow-
ments in terms of geography and infrastructure, as well as poor house-
hold endowments in terms of labour and assets. In many ways, the fac-
tors causing marginalisation on the global scale are similar to these
causing within-country marginalisation.
These insights were illustrated using Ethiopia as a case study.
Ethiopia has started a process of market and international trade liber-
alisation, but definitely still belongs to the group of ‘marginalised’
economies in the world. Growth remains limited, and poverty is highly
persistent. The welfare impact of the domestic market liberalisation in
the first part of the 1990s also illustrates the risks related to further
marginalisation of some of the poor in Ethiopia. While one substan-
tial group of the poor has been able to take advantage of the recent
improved  economic  environment,  another  group  seems  to  have
become increasingly marginalised. Investment in infrastructure and
human capital provides the best hope to overcome their inherent mar-
ginal endowments in terms of infrastructure and other assets. 
Nike, that controversial symbol of globalising investment in devel-
oping countries, is definitely not about to invest in Ethiopia. I for one
believe that Ethiopia has intrinsically far more potential for success in
growth and poverty reduction than Uganda and many other African
countries. But for the foreseeable future, Nike is Ethiopia’s Godot.
Substantial efforts in creating a better investment climate, as well as
creating the conditions so that the poor could take advantage of such
changes are needed to at least prepare the ground for its arrival.
NOTES
1. The group also includes Argentina, Bangladesh, Brazil, Malaysia, Mexico, the Philip-
pines and Thailand, and some other smaller countries. 
2. World Bank (2002) is aware of this possible misleading use of the term ‘globalisers’
noting that the rise in trade may not have been the consequence of pro-trade policies
but ‘may have been due to other policies or even to pure chance’. 
3. In 1970, the Kenyan Shilling, the Tanzanian Shilling, the Ugandan Shilling and the
Ethiopian Birr were all trading at 2 to the U.S. Dollar. The exchange rates are
now about 76 Kenyan Shillings per dollar, 1070 Tanzanian Shillings per dollar and
6162000 Ugandan Shillings per dollar, while the Ethiopian Birr is trading at 8.5 Birr per
dollar. 
4. Terms of trade are here defined as a (Laspeyres) output-weighted producer price
deflated by a local consumer price index, using 1989 as a base.
5. Since it is not a nationally representative sample, this is not necessarily consistent
with national figures. Whether poverty declined in this period in Ethiopia cannot be
established since no large nationally representative samples were collected until 1995.
The poverty line used in this study is based on a food basket needed to consume the
absolute minimum calories to be active. Using other conventional poverty lines, such
as the one-dollar-a-day line used by the World Bank would put poverty substantially
higher. 
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